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A NEW PARADIGM FOR INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS*
KENNETH C. RANDALL**
JOHN E. NORRIS***
INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a theoretical analysis of international business law.
An international business transaction is any type of deal between parties
from at least two different countries. These transactions include sales,
leases, licenses, and investments; the parties to international business
deals include individuals, small and large multinational corporations,
and even countries. Most existing international business law literature
provides nuts-and-bolts descriptions of specific laws governing particular
types of transnational deals.' This Article, however, more broadly dis-
cusses the evolution of laws regulating many kinds of international busi-
ness transactions. Its thesis is that the modern world community has
established a new paradigm for transacting international business-alter-
ing the most fundamental ways in which the law conceptualizes and en-
forces deals struck between international actors.
The means by which the law regulates international business have
changed directly in response to structural changes in the world legal or-
der itself. At the risk of painting the picture with too broad a stroke, this
Article describes the evolutionary landscape as a triptych. First, when
the world community was much more decentralized than it is today, do-
mestic commercial and corporate law regulated international business.
Lawyers viewed international deals as quintessentially private, and there
was no international business law to provide substantive rules of deci-
sion. Instead, the terms "private international law" and "conflicts of
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law" were synonymous. So when a dispute arose over an international
business deal, a tribunal would determine which of two or more conflict-
ing domestic laws should govern the underlying transaction; they often
would respect a contract's choice-of-law clause if one existed.2 Second,
during a subsequent transitional period, the legal community began to
apply a growing body of international customary law known as lex mer-
catoria, or law of merchants, to international business deals. As world
trade and communications became increasingly interdependent, this in-
termediate period fostered the growth of a limited type of substantive
international law, based primarily upon the common trade usages and
practices among merchants, as well as such universally recognized legal
principles as pacta sunt servanda (i.e., one should fulfill one's agree-
ments). Third and finally, in today's centralized global atmosphere, legal
institutions are creating a true body of substantive international law to
regulate many transnational business deals. With the world community
growing smaller and closer, it recently has established several multilat-
eral commercial treaties. The 1980 Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) 3-a supranational counterpart to Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code-is but one significant example of this
phenomenon.4
This Article's organization corresponds with the three evolutionary
periods outlined above. Part I discusses the early choice-of-law treat-
ment of international business transactions. Part II concerns the transi-
tional creation of customary international law, or the lex mercatoria, to
regulate international business. Part III addresses several recent treaties
that regulate various types of transnational business deals. The Article's
separate treatment of the three periods, however, should not suggest a
discrete division between them; the periods actually demonstrate the
law's evolution and blend into one another. Finally, Part IV demon-
strates that the third evolutionary period-the substantive regulation of
international business by treaty law-relates to a paradigmatic or struc-
tural revision of the international legal system. It shows that comprehen-
sive multilateral treaties, in particular, represent a new supranational law
of international business. This new law is quite appropriate in an in-
2. See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
3. Final.Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Annex I, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) (with commentary)
[hereinafter CISG].
4. See infra notes 46-106 and accompanying text.
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creasingly interdependent global community, with enhanced technology
and communications and a more harmonized social and political agenda.
The new paradigm also facilitates the greatly increased volume of inter-
national business and accommodates the increased involvement of na-
tion-states as parties to transnational business. Drawing upon social
science learning, this Article concludes that the structural revision of the
international system itself-a paradigmatic shift-has precipitated a fun-
damental revision in the way the law regulates transnational business.
I. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Nomenclature
The title of this Part, "Private International Law," conveys the very
essence of the first evolutionary period. The legal community viewed in-
ternational business as a matter of private, not public or sovereign, con-
cern. Lawyers employed the term "private international law" to
distinguish it from the term "public international law." As traditionally
defined, public international law governs only nation-state relationships,5
with nation-states exclusively and independently sovereign over legal
matters, resources, and citizens within their territory. Under this con-
ception, nation-states are the exclusive actors in or subjects of public in-
ternational law; non-state entities such as individuals and business
entities are the mere objects of public international law.6 Hence, public
international law is limited to issues that affect one nation's dealings with
another. Examples of such issues include: demarcating geographical
boundaries; dividing authority over land, sea, and space territories; initi-
ating and resolving armed conflict; and protecting the global environ-
ment.7 Nation-states created "public law" to regulate these matters by
establishing relevant bilateral or multilateral treaties, or by developing
5. "[Tlhe Law of Nations is primarily a law for the international conduct of states, and not of
their citizens. As a rule, the subjects of the rights and duties arising from the Law of Nations are
states solely and exclusively." I LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 19 (C.
Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
6. Id. Ian Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 Va. L. Rev. 435,
435-40 (1964). For a critique of the classical statist perspective and an argument that today non-
state entities may be the subjects of some parts of public international law, see KENNETH C. RAN-
DALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM 39-49 (1990).
7. For example, those are some of the topics typically included in public international law
classes. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1987). International busi-
ness transactions is usually taught separately. See, eg., RALPH H. FOLSOM, ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2d ed. 1991).
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reciprocal legal rights and duties under customary international law.'
On the other hand, private international law has no real substance.
Used interchangeably with the term "conflicts of laws," private interna-
tional law determines which of two (or more) relevant but conflicting
sovereigns' laws should resolve a dispute. As an English commentator
described in traditional terms, private international law controls "cases
in which some relevant fact has a geographical connection with a foreign
country and may... raise a question as to the application of one's own
or the appropriate foreign law to the determination of the issue or as to
the... jurisdiction [of] one's own or foreign courts." 9 The conflict-of-
laws area encompasses choice-of-law issues (this Part's main concern) as
well as questions about jurisdiction and recognizing foreign judgments.10
The label "private international law" is misleading where U.S. law is
involved, because conflicts rules apply to both interstate and interna-
tional transactions and cases." Conflicts rules thus may apply to a trans-
action that has no international component, just as they apply to truly
international transactions. For example, a New York State court in a
commercial case would view both Georgia and Canadian corporations as
"foreign"; it would view the places of contracting and performance as
foreign whether occurring on Georgia or Canadian soil; and it would
view both Georgia and Canadian law as foreign. Judges deem both such
interstate and international scenarios as similarly raising conflicts ques-
tions, and they traditionally have not applied conflicts rules differently in
interstate and international cases. 12 However, no matter how foreign
Georgians may seem to New Yorkers (and vice versa), the "interna-
tional" in "private international law" is a misnomer because private in-
ternational law applies to interstate cases as well. This misnomer
symbolizes the "private" and not necessarily the "international" charac-
ter of international business transactions during this first evolutionary
period.
8. Treaties and custom are the two major sources of public international law. See Statute of
the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
9. R.H. GRAVESON, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (6th ed. 1969).
10. See HERBERT F. GOODRICH & EUGENE F. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-6 (1964).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS § 10 (1971).
12. See id. A minority of commentaries have argued that conflicts rules should apply differ-
ently in international cases and interstate cases. See, eg., ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 16-21 (1967); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law:
A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717 (1957); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International
Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1966).
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More significantly, the term "private international law" is misleading
in suggesting that a body of international law exists to regulate interna-
tional transactions. During the first era of transnational business, there
actually was no supranational commercial law. Not only did substantive
international law not exist in this area, but, early on, no international
choice-of-law rules existed.13 Instead, when international business deals
soured and the parties went to court, a domestic court used the forum's
domestic choice-of-law rules to determine which domestic business law
applied. Not international, but domestic law regulated the forum's
choice of law, and the forum chose from among two or more domestic
laws. Even where the parties had pre-selected the particular domestic
law to govern their deal, the domestic court would use the forum's do-
mestic law to determine whether to honor the contractual choice-of-law
clause.4 Indeed, in the early stages of this evolutionary period, there
was little international about private international law-except that an
international actor or activity was sometimes involved in the business
deal.
Private international law during this period did not involve interna-
tional norms for a very simple reason: the legal community viewed inter-
national law as relevant only to sovereign dealings. International law
was irrelevant to business deals between private parties even from differ-
ent countries. Public international law-or the "law of nations" or sim-
ply "international law" -governed only nation-state relations and
traditionally was relevant only to sovereign actors (the law's subjects).
Public international law was irrelevant to non-sovereign actors (the law's
objects). 16
At this time, sovereigns were kings, and everyone else was nothing.
Domestic law, rather than international law, chose and shaped the norms
regulating a variety of legal transactions and disputes between non-sover-
eign parties-whether sounding in contract, tort, matrimonial, or prop-
13. See infra note 103 and accompanying text regarding more modem international conflicts
treaties.
14. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
15. The term "international law" is shorthand for the term "public international law" and not
"private international law." The term "law of nations" is an older term referring to sources of
public international law other than treaties. "[The law of nations ... may be ascertained by con-
sulting the works ofjurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat) 153, 160-61 (1820). See generally Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early
American Law, 42 VAND. L. REv. 819 (1989).
16. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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erty law. Private international law's true domestic character did not
change just because one party was a citizen of or incorporated in a differ-
ent country than the other party; its domestic character likewise did not
change just because the place of contracting or performance (or other
behavior) occurred in another country. The presence of such foreign ele-
ments might have raised conflicts-of-law questions, but municipal law
answered those questions. In sum, the legal community did not establish
international or supranational law to govern private international trans-
actions in this early historical stage. The nomenclature of "private inter-
national law" accurately suggests the presence of a private legal matter,
but inaccurately suggests the availability of international law to regulate
that matter.
B. Choice of Law and International Business
In the first theoretical scheme, how did domestic choice-of-law rules
regulate international business? Most international business transactions
are contractual in nature. Business entities from two or more nations
usually enter into a contract to sell, lease, license, or invest in a product
or service. At least where written contracts exist, the parties may try to
preempt domestic law by extensively spelling out the terms of their deal
and articulating in great detail their respective rights and duties should
certain foreseeable problems or contingencies occur.1 7 The parties re-
duce or avoid the application of domestic law to their deal by leaving as
few gaps as possible in their contract. Thus, domestic law-from
whatever nation-has fewer contractual gaps to fill. If a dispute over the
deal ends up in court or arbitration, the tribunal may simply enforce the
contract's terms, assuming that those terms do not violate the forum's
norms or a significant public policy.18 In this sense, private international
law certainly does not involve any real international or public law. The
private parties mostly have regulated their own deal contractually, with
the tribunal serving merely as an enforcement mechanism. Private inter-
national law is only required to choose a substantive domestic law where
the parties either did not foresee the contingency that led to the conflict,
or where they foresaw it but, for whatever reason, chose not to deal with
it contractually in advance.
17. Tyler Brown, Note, Choice of Law Stipulations by Litigants, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 141,
143 (1986).
18. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 58-61 (1971);
Brown, supra note 17, at 141 n.1.
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The parties to an international business deal may also try to achieve
autonomy by putting a choice-of-law clause in their contract. For exam-
ple, when negotiating a sale of goods, a United States widget manufac-
turer and a French retailer might decide that either American or French
law should govern their transaction. Of course, if they choose American
law, which the United States company might prefer, the manufacturer
might have to make concessions to the retailer on another point of nego-
tiation (such as on the price of the widgets or on delivering or insuring
the widgets). The parties might also select American law to govern one
part of the transaction, and, if normatively compatible, French law on
another part.19 They alternatively might choose the law of a third coun-
try to regulate their deal, so that neither party benefits from the familiar-
ity of choosing its own law.20 Most legal systems, however, will not
enforce such a choice unless the deal has some reasonable connection
with that third country.21 For example, if the United States manufac-
turer and French retailer negotiated and entered into their contract in
Germany at a widget industry convention, they might contractually se-
lect German law to control the sale. Parties to international business
deals may enhance their autonomy by including not only choice-of-law
clauses in their contracts, but also choice-of-forum (or arbitration)
clauses.22
Most courts will enforce choice-of-law clauses.23 In addition, courts
typically honor choice-of-forum and arbitration clauses.24 In many juris-
dictions, dating from the beginning of this evolutionary period, there is
significant precedent for honoring the parties' choice of law in interna-
19. See JOVITA J. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 366 (1957). See also Louis C.
James, Effects of the Autonomy of the Parties in Conflict of Laws Contracts, 36 CHI. KENT L. REV.
34, 37-38 (1959).
20. See generally Joost Bloom, Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of Con-
tract, Part II, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L LAW 207 (1979); David J. Branson & Richard E. Wallace, Jr.,
Choosing the Substantive Law to Apply in International Commercial Arbitration, 27 VA. J. INT'L L.
39 (1986).
21. See Brown, supra note 17.
22. See generally FOLSOM, ET. AL., supra note 7, at 1160-62.
23. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 157-67 (1943);
SALONGA, supra note 19, at 358-67; MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 420-35
(1945); James G. Vaughter, Choice of Law for International Contracts: An American Critique: 2
TEX. INT'L L. FORUM 227 (1966); Hessel E. Yntema, 'Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J.
COMP. L. 341 (1952).
24. See Branson & Wallace, supra note 20, at 39-40. There are exceptions, however, as some
states do not recognize choice-of-forum clauses.
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tional business transactions. 25 That precedent established certain condi-
tions for validating choice-of-law clauses: the country whose law is
selected must have a nexus with the deal; the chosen law must not con-
tradict a significant public policy of the judicial forum; and the parties
may not use a choice-of-law clause to avoid criminal liability.2 6
The judiciary's deference to choice-of-law clauses reinforces the legal
community's treatment of international business as private in nature,
subject to relatively little sovereign control. Courts simply let interna-
tional business partners pick which domestic norms will fill their contrac-
tual gaps. Even in the absence of an explicit choice-of-law selection, the
judiciary sometimes has tried to divine the parties' implicit preference-
applying the law that the parties probably would have selected had they
thought about it beforehand and put their thoughts into writing.27 This
is not to suggest that all jurisdictions have always equally and consist-
ently enforced choice-of-law clauses. Courts sometimes have preferred
the domestic law of either the country of contracting or the country of
performance over the domestic law that the parties selected.2" Once this
evolutionary period was underway, however, both foreign and United
States judges and arbitrators usually deferred to the parties' choice of
law.29
C. Epochal Evolution
Although the three evolutionary periods shade into each other, the
first period ran approximately and predominantly from the eighteenth to
mid-twentieth centuries. From the beginning of significant international
trade to the start of the lex mercatoria period, the conflicts approach
governed transnational business. As previously discussed, that approach
viewed transnational business to be just as private as a business deal be-
tween two United States entities from different states of the Union.30
To summarize, the legal community did not create substantive interna-
tional law to govern transnational deals. Instead, just as with interstate
transactions, the international actors were accorded much autonomy to
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 187.
26. See Brown, supra note 17.
27. See Yntema, supra note 23, at 343; SALOGNA, supra note 19, at 368-79; WOLFF, supra note
23, at 435-45.
28. See Bloom, supra note 20, at 209. See generally, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF
CONFLICTS (1934).
29. See sources cited supra notes 23, 25.
30. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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regulate their own deal contractually. Moreover, parties typically could
choose which domestic law would govern if and when their contract
failed its task of self-governance. 31 The private international law relevant
to transnational deals thus was very different from the substantive public
international law relevant to nation-state dealings.
As the final Part of this Article articulates, the conflicts approach con-
formed to the structure and nature of the world legal order during the
eighteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. Almost all international business
transactions at that time involved entirely private, not sovereign actors.
The world legal community left non-sovereign matters-including pri-
vate transnational business-to domestic control. The world legal order
was relatively decentralized, lacking significant interdependence through
either international organizations or international telecommunications.32
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the nations did not come together dur-
ing this epoch to create substantive commercial or business law to govern
private deals between foreign actors. Similarly, it is not illogical that the
family of nations did not even create international conflicts rules during
this period (although they did so later).33 This epoch, however, began to
evolve as international business expanded; as sovereign actors themselves
participated increasingly in international business; and as businessper-
sons sought more normative uniformity and stability in the regulation of
their transactions.3 4 All these developments led to the dawning of a sec-
ond evolutionary period.
II. THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA
The uncertainties of the conflicts approach became troublesome to the
international business community following the Second World War.
This period was marked by an increasing volume and variety of trade
across national borders, particularly at first among the Allied Powers of
World War II. With increasing trade came an increasing need for a cer-
tain, predictable set of laws governing international business deals. The
conflicts approach proved inadequate because of the inability of business-
people to predict confidently which nation's law would govern. More-
over, even where the parties could predict the applicable nation's law,
one or more parties were often at a disadvantage in their ability to ascer-
31. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 41.
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tain the content of that law because of language barriers and lack of ex-
perience with that regulation. As nation-states themselves transacted
more business with each other or with private parties, the need for fair
and predictable norms also increased.
As a result, the "new Lex Mercatoria," or the new law merchant, be-
gan to supplant the conflicts approach. This body of mercantile law is
autonomous in its origin and nature, meaning that it is of truly interna-
tional rather than national origin.35 The lex mercatoria draws upon ac-
cepted customary business practices among international actors. As a
law that merchants developed for merchants, it is naturally pro-mercan-
tile in content. Of course, the new lex mercatoria did not develop over-
night. Rather, its origins date to the very beginning of international
trade in the Middle Ages. Again, all of the international business periods
have interrelated evolutionary roots and do not arise in a vacuum.
The medieval law merchant was developed in the context of a lack of
national regulation of international trade. The medieval merchant
courts, over which merchants, not lawyers, presided, developed a set of
pro-mercantile rules. The law merchant included what is now the law of
admiralty, as well as rules respecting negotiable paper and sales. The
medieval law merchant is also the source of the contract now known as
the bill of exchange.36 Prior to this period, no nation's law recognized
such a tripartite financing arrangement.37
With the rise of the modern nation-state in the late-seventeenth, eight-
eenth, and nineteenth centuries, the importance of the medieval lex mer-
catoria as a source of law declined. Nations formulated their own
municipal rules of commercial transactions at the onset of a decentral-
ized world order in the seventeenth century. In so doing, nations incor-
porated a great many of the principles of the lex mercatoria, but
unfortunately with variations peculiar to each nation's political and eco-
35. Lord Mansfield's statement that the law merchant "is not the law of a particular country,
but the general law of nations" is as applicable to the new lex mercatoria as to the medieval version.
Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 883, 887 (K.B. 1759).
36. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
37. Professor Schmitthoff, one of the foremost authorities on the new lex mercatoria, provides a
concise history of the medieval law merchant in Clive M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A
New Law Merchant, in II CURRENT LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 129 (Ronald St. J. MacDonald
ed., 1961). For more complete treatment, see WYNDHAM A. BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW
MERCHANT (1923); WILLIAM MITCHELL, ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW
MERCHANT (1903).
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nomic climate.3 s Professor Philip W. Thayer wrote the following vivid
description of this absorption of the law merchant into the municipal law
of England:
With the accession of Coke as Chief Justice in 1606, began a period during
which the law merchant in England was absorbed gradually into the com-
mon law. The King's judges, always jealous of the special tribunals of the
merchants, usurped their functions and took over their law .... If the
process of absorption thus resulted inevitably in the increasing desuetude of
the purely commercial courts, the consequences on the substantive side
were likely to be equally marked. The customary doctrines of the law
merchant could not be fitted in all cases into the more rigid framework of
the common law without distortion. In more than one direction that was
bound to affect its commercial application, the common law had been sub-
jected to backgrounds peculiarly English and divorced from any interna-
tional influences. With the conclusion of the period of absorption,
therefore, the commercial law of England still might be based fundamen-
tally on the customs of merchants, and to that extent might retain a cosmo-
politan flavor as its chief distinction; but the direct reflection of former days
had become a refraction.39
Following the medieval law merchant's demise, domestic law varia-
tions precipitated the conflicts-of-law approach, as discussed in Part I'
The mercantile need for predictability and certainty, however, drove the
re-emergence of the new lex mercatoria, just as it did the earlier version.
The lex mercatoria's increased importance after World War II was the
result of an increasing volume of trade and, perhaps just as importantly,
the gaining popularity of arbitration as a preferred means of dispute reso-
lution.41 While domestic tribunals myopically applied domestic conflicts
and substantive rules, arbitrators applied the lex mercatoria. The lex
mercatoria, though certainly pro-mercantile, treated the merchants of all
countries equally. Arbitrators in particular applied it more neutrally to
international entities than the more nationally ethnocentric domestic
judges applied domestic laws. Lawyers heralded the developing lex mer-
38. See LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW
23-37 (1983).
39. Philip W. Thayer, Comparative Law and the Law Merchants, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 139, 142-
43 (1936) (citations omitted).
40. See supra Part I.
41. See generally HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(Ernest J. Cohn et a]. eds., 1977); INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Clive M. Schmitt-
hoff ed., 1974).
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catoria as a welcome era in international business, remedying many of
the shortcomings of the conflicts approach.
Reliance on the new lex mercatoria as an important source of law has
problems, however, and certainly does not have all the advantages of the
later treaty approach.42 Two of the key problems are: (1) the law
merchants' uncertain status as a legitimate, separate source of law; and
(2) the difficulty of using confidential arbitral decisions, the primary
source of the lex mercatoria, as precedent for future decisions.
The first problem, concerning the legitimacy of the lex mercatoria as
law, is perhaps of more theoretical than practical concern. Nevertheless,
it has practical importance to the extent that courts and other adjudica-
tory bodies are more likely to find favor with and apply a more "legiti-
mate" set of laws. Rigid positivists argue against recognizing the lex
mercatoria as a legitimate source of law on the ground that law must, by
definition, be enforceable by a sovereign with the power to impose force
in support of its judgments.43 The lex mercatoria cannot meet this defi-
nition of "law" because, like customary international law, it draws upon
usually unwritten practices and usages common to business transactions.
Others take a more pragmatic view. They argue that because arbitral
tribunals apply the new law merchant to resolve disputes and parties take
that law into account in drafting international instruments, the lex mer-
catoria is, on some level, law.' Whichever jurisprudential view is pre-
ferred, however, it is clear that the lex mercatoria is a nonpositivistic
source of law and thus will never obtain the legitimacy of treaties.
Another problem with the lex mercatoria stems from the prevalence of
its application by arbitral panels, rather than courts. Because arbitration
awards are usually confidential,45 they are not a particularly useful
source of precedent to guide future decision-making. Trying to predict
what an arbitral panel will do is therefore like trying to predict the next
abortion decision by the United States Supreme Court without the benefit
of the Court's past decisions in the area. The basic outlines of the lex
mercatoria, including its emphasis on common usages and adherence to
such basic principles as the freedom to contract and pacta sunt servanda,
42. See generally infra Part III.
43. See, eg., George R. Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts:
The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REv. 575 (1989).
44. See, eg., Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRA-
TION 99-108 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
45. Indeed, it is precisely this confidentiality that often persuades parties to include an arbitra-
tion clause in their contracts.
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are well known. However, this knowledge is often not helpful in the con-
text of a highly technical conflict between sophisticated international par-
ties. Moreover, even if arbitral decisions were made public, their value is
slight because lengthy explications of the ruling are not required and the
decisions analyze few written rules. So the lex mercatoria again is not
positivistic, but rather more akin to customary international law. More
precise precedent would be far more helpful in this context, particularly
where unique or complex deals are involved. However, more precise pre-
cedent is simply unavailable.
For these reasons, the new lex mercatoria was not completely satisfac-
tory as a system of laws to govern international business transactions.
Lawyers needed more positivistic and widely applied regulation not only
in arbitration, but also in the published decisions of municipal courts.
The need for such an approach has resulted, in the last ten years, in the
third epoch in the development of international business law. Just as the
medieval law merchant did not fit the changing world of the seventeenth
century, the new law merchant does not fit the current and changing
world scene.
III. MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND THE MODERN EPOCH
The epoch in which the lex mercatoria served as the primary source of
substantive rules governing international business transactions4 6 also
marked the infancy of the current multilateral treaty approach. The rise
over the last fifteen years of comprehensive multilateral treaties gov-
erning commercial matters4 7 signals the beginning of the modern para-
46. See generally supra part II.
47. CISG, supra note 3; United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and
International Promissory Notes, U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, 21st Sess., at 2-42, U.N.
Doc. A/43/820 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 170 (1989) (with commentary) [hereinafter CIBN];
Conventions on International Factoring and on International Lease Financing, Unidraft Conf.
7/C.1/W.P.27 (1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M 922 (1988) (with commentary) [hereinafter CILF].
In addition to these broadly applicable conventions, multilateral treaties that are more specialized
in focus have recently been enacted. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 28 I.L.M. 1477 (1989); Arrangement Re-
garding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001; GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE ORGANIZATION, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 7 (33d Supp. 1987).
The world order is also increasingly marked by regional multilateral treaties. The most systematic
regional efforts are those of the European Economic Community. See, e.g., Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, O.J. (L 266) 1 (1980); Convention on the Contract for Inter-
national Carriage of Goods by Road, May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 190. The Americas, however,
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digm's adolescence and its promise of future adulthood. During this
final evolutionary period, the world community has established truly in-
ternational substantive law to govern many transnational business deals.
By creating multilateral treaties, the global community has progressed
far from the conflicts approach under domestic law in the original evolu-
tionary stage.
The modern treaties also signal progress from the lex mercatoria ap-
proach, representing a much more developed, uniform, and positivistic
commitment to centralized international business regulation. At the
same time, the new multilateral treaties also contain provisions reflecting
the tension between sovereign preference for domestic law and the desire
for supranational commercial law. While surely representing progress,
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) and other treaties still reflect national ambivalence
about the replacement of domestic law with international law.
The following analysis of the modern epoch focuses on the multilateral
treaties that are the chief feature of the current international business
landscape. Subpart A emphasizes the CISG, which has particularly im-
portant implications for the new paradigm. The CISG and other major
multilateral treaties (addressed in Subpart B) have given rise to a new
paradigm of international business.
A. The CISG
1. Introduction
The cornerstone of the recent trend toward unification of international
business law is the CISG, which the world's major trading powers have
adopted.48 The CISG governs the formation of, and remedies for breach-
ing, contracts for the sale of goods between parties of different nations.
The analogy in United States law is to Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
have also made some efforts in this inter-regional area. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, 29 I.L.M. 81 (1990).
48. Signatories include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussia Soviet Socialist
Republic, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hun-
gary, Iraq, Italy, Lesotho, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republics, the former U.S.S.R., United
States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary Gen-
eral as of3l December 1990, U.N. Doc. St./LEG/SER.E/9 (1990). Guinea, Canada, and Romania
acceded to the CISG in 1991. Id. (update as of Oct. 7, 1991). Ecuador and Uganda acceded to the
CISG in early 1992. Id. (update as of Feb. 12, 1992).
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cial Code, as applicable in 49 of the 50 states.49 Legal scholars have
perhaps discussed no treaty since those marking the end of World War II
as extensively as the CISG.5 Indeed, little remains to be said about the
treaty with respect to its history51 or the potential interpretive difficulties
presented by its substantive provisions.52 Another mechanical descrip-
tion of the CISG is not needed here. Accordingly, the following analysis
of the CISG's provisions is not offered as a comprehensive introduction
to or description of the treaty. Rather, in keeping with this Article's
focus, 3 it analyzes the CISG's central and concrete manifestations of the
new paradigm within the context of the paradigm's normative
framework.
2. The CISG's Scope
The CISG's scope provisions are the natural focus for such an analysis
because they centrally implicate those aspects of nationalism and sover-
eignty upon which the new paradigm has its most radical impact. When
49. U.C.C. (1990).
50. For a comprehensive collection of such works written prior to the CISG's effective date, see
Laura E. Longobardi, Note, Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: The 1980 United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 863, 863 n.1 (1985).
More recent works include Amy J. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International
Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WAsH. L. REv. 607
(1988); Arthur G. Murphy, Jr., Consequential Damages in Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods and the Legacy of Hadley, 23 GEO WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 415 (1989); Maureen T.
Murphy, Note, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Creating
Uniformity in International Sales Law, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 727 (1989); Muna Ndulo, The Vi-
enna Sales Convention 1980 and the Hague Uniform Laws on International Sale of Goods 1964: A
Comparative Analysis, 38 INV'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1989); Elizabeth Hayes Patterson, United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Unification and the Tension Between
Compromise and Domination, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 263 (1986); John C. Reitz, A History of Cutoff
Rules as a Form of Caveat Emptor: Part I-The 1980 U.N. Convention on the International Sale of
Goods, 36 AM. J. INI'L L. 437 (1988); Robert S. Rendell, The New U.N. Convention on International
Sales Contracts: An Overview, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 23 (1989); Francois Vergne, The "Battle of the
Forms" under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
33 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (1985); Sara G. Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage
Between Socialist, Third World, Common, and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 109 (1988); V. Susanne Cook, Note, The Need for Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 197 (1988);
Barry Nicholas, Note, The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, 105 L.Q. REV. 201
(1989); Michael Stonberg, Note, Drafting Contracts under the Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 245 (1988).
51. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 50, at 128.
52. See, eg., Vergne, supra note 50; Longobardi, supra note 50; Reitz, supra note 50; Murphy,
supra note 50.
53. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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the CISG's substantive international law rules apply to a given transac-
tion, at least one nation may not apply its municipal law to that transac-
tion. In other words, the CISG's international law trumps the domestic
law regulation of a deal in whole or in part. As Part IV discusses more
fully, this relinquishment of sovereign jurisdiction is radical in its concep-
tion, challenging the very core of an international order composed of
sovereign states.
The CISG's intricate scheme begins with Chapter I (Articles 1-6),
which provides the general rules for determining whether the CISG ap-
plies.54 Article 1(1) provides:
1. This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose places of business are in different States;
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the applica-
tion of the law of a Contracting State.55
Under article 1, lawyers must answer at least two inquiries about
whether the CISG applies to a particular transaction. First, is the con-
tract one for the sale of goods? Though somewhat technical, this ques-
tion is noteworthy because of the wide breadth of the category of sales of
goods. Because of the quantity and variety of such transactions, interna-
tional sales of goods constitute the most important category of interna-
tional business transactions. Virtually every exportation of every type of
product or resource across national boundaries constitutes an interna-
tional sale of goods. The acquiescence of nations to a non-sovereign body
of law in such a highly important field is unprecedented and evidences
the CISG's significance.
The second inquiry in determining whether the CISG applies is
whether the parties' places of business make the CISG applicable. This
inquiry includes the initial question whether the parties' "places of busi-
ness are in different States."56 It also includes the question whether those
"different States" are ones mandating application of the treaty under sub-
sections (a) and (b) of article 1. If both nations are CISG signatories,
54. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 1-6.
55. CISG, supra note 3, art. I(1).
56. CISG, supra note 3, art. 1. Determining a party's place of business itself involves some
interesting analysis. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 1(2), 10. One aspect of this question relevant to this
Article's theme is the uncertain treatment the CISG gives to large multinational corporations that
have no one place of business. It is unclear whether courts will resolve this uncertainty in favor of
applying the CISG or applying municipal law rules.
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then the CISG applies.57 If neither nation is a signatory, then of course
it does not apply. Where one nation is a signatory but one is not,
whether the CISG applies depends upon whether choice-of-law princi-
ples mandate the application of a signatory's municipal law and, in turn,
upon whether that signatory accepts the terms of article l(l)(b) or has
taken a reservation pursuant to article 95.1s This interplay between arti-
cle 1 and article 95 directly reflects the struggle in the CISG's negotiation
process to reconcile state sovereignty with CISG applicability.
Article l's goal is to supplant domestic law with international law,
particularly in cases where one parties' domestic law might apply to the
exclusion of the other's domestic law. Article 95, however, allows a na-
tion, at the time of ratification, to make a reservation not to be bound by
article l(l)(b)-the sub-paragraph making the CISG's law applicable
when private international law would choose a party's domestic law.59 If
a nation makes such a reservation, the CISG applies only to transactions
where both parties hale from nations that are CISG parties (under article
l(l)(a)). Such reservations thus reduce the number of transactions to
which the CISG applies.
The United States ratified the CISG subject to this reservation under
article 95. 6 Accordingly, if choice-of-law rules mandate the application
of U.S. law to a transaction between an American party and a party from
a non-CISG nation, presumably Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) governs the transaction61 instead of the CISG. The
CISG's international rules do not supplant U.S. domestic law in such
transactions--contrary to the CISG's goal of establishing an interna-
tional sales code. Some commentators have questioned whether ratifica-
tion subject to this reservation constitutes true ratification.62
It is difficult indeed to see any substantive distinction between a trans-
action involving two CISG parties and one between a CISG party and a
non-CISG party. Nevertheless, the treaty's history reveals that the
United States insisted that a reservation clause reflecting such a distinc-
tion (i.e., article 95) be placed in the treaty.63 The United States insisted
on this provision solely to reduce the instances when the CISG would
57. CISG, supra note 3, art. l(1)(a).
58. CISG, supra note 3, art. 95.
59. CISG, supra note 3, art. 95.
60. Stonberg, supra note 50, at 247.
61. The U.C.C. is applicable in every jurisdiction in the United States except Louisiana.
62. See, eg., Nicholas, supra note 50, at 202.
63. Stonberg, supra note 50, at 247.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
616 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
apply to transactions involving an American party. The U.C.C. applies
when the CISG does not, and the U.S. apparently prefers its own law to
international law. The U.S. may even view Article 2 of the U.C.C. as
superior to the CISG as a sales law.r This proprietary attitude is a per-
fect illustration of the inherent tension between sovereignty and multilat-
eral treaties embodying substantive rules.
One may find further examples of such tension in articles 92-96. These
provisions allow a nation to make other significant reservations affecting
the CISG's applicability in deals involving that nation's business enti-
ties. 65 Article 92 lets a nation make a reservation not to be bound by
Part II of the treaty (dealing with contract formation) or Part III (deal-
ing with contract performance and remedies for breach).66 Article 93
allows a nation to make a reservation so that only one of its multiple
territorial units is bound by the treaty.67 Article 94 allows a reservation
by two nations with similar laws not to be bound by the treaty concern-
ing transactions between nationals of those nation-states.6 8 Finally, arti-
cle 96 allows a nation to make a reservation not to be bound by the
treaty's statute-of-frauds provisions, which essentially would allow any
contract to be oral in deals involving a business from that nation.69 All
these provisions allow nations to apply their own law in situations where
the CISG would otherwise apply. The treaty's history reveals that in-
cluding these provisions was necessary to garner signatures by nations
that, like the United States, were reluctant to have international law su-
persede municipal law.7°
The CISG's scope is limited further by its "opt-out" provision.7 Arti-
cle 6 of the treaty provides as follows: "The parties may exclude the
application of this Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or
vary the effect of any of its provisions."72 This provision allowing busi-
64. Stonberg, supra note 50, at 247; Zwart, supra note 50, at 111 n.20.
65. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 92-96.
66. CISG, supra note 3, art. 92.
67. CISG, supra note 3, art 93.
68. CISG, supra note 3, art. 94.
69. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 11, 29 & 96.
70. Zwart, supra note 50, at I 11.
71. CISG, supra note 3, art. 6.
72. CISG, supra note 3, art. 6. Article 12 (which article 6 mentions) forbids the parties from
derogating from or varying the effect of a state's reservation to the CISG's "no Statute of Frauds"
provision. See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 11-12. If a state has made such a reservation, its require-
ment of a writing applies even where the CISG otherwise applies, so that parties in this situation
may not agree to have the CISG apply with no Statute of Frauds requirement.
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ness partners autonomy to choose domestic law over the CISG's law is
reminiscent of the private international law era.73 This opt-out provision
may reduce the CISG's use, if the contractual parties choose domestic
law instead of international law. Nevertheless, the CISG represents pro-
gress from other multilateral business treaties that required business ac-
tors to "opt-in" to a treaty's provisions and affirmatively choose to apply
the treaty to their deal. 74 Although the opt-out provision reduces the
CISG's utility and mandate, it shows an expanded commitment to inter-
national business law over treaties with opt-in provisions.
3. Substantive Provisions
The CISG's substantive provisions also reflect tension with municipal
law. The treaty's inclusion of several topics required compromise among
the signatories, who usually were reluctant to acquiesce in provisions
that differed significantly from their own law.7' The Eastern and West-
ern blocs confronted one another over such issues as the need for a writ-
ing, the mirror-image rule, and trade usages. 76 The nations eventually
reached compromises in these three areas, but often in ways that de-
parted from U.S. law.77
Contrary to unification efforts, however, the nations could not reach
agreement on several other controversial topics. They excluded those
topics from the CISG's coverage rather than risk the entire treaty's fail-
ure. Because of the differences in domestic treatment of products liabil-
ity, for example, consumer sales were expressly excluded. 78  Likewise,
liability for personal injuries and death was excluded, 79 as were defenses
to the formation of a contract, including fraud, duress, and
unconscionability.8s
The CISG's drafters resolved one controversial topic, the availability
of equitable relief for breach, in a way that may cause interpretive diffi-
73. For an exhaustive analysis of the CISG's choice of law framework, particularly as com-
pared with that of the U.C.C., see Isaak I. Dore, Choice of Law Under the International Sales Con-
vention: A.A.S. Perspective, 77 AM. J. INT. L. 521 (1983).
74. E.g., CIBN, supra note 47, arts. 1(1) & (2).
75. See Zwart, supra note 50, at 111.
76. See Zwart, supra note 50, at 116.
77. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 3, arts. 11 (rejection of writing requirement) & 19 (acceptance of
mirror image rule, rejected in U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990)).
78. CISG, supra note 3, art. 2; see Zwart, supra note 50, at 111.
79. CISG, supra note 3, art. 5.
80. CISG, supra note 3, art. 4.
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culties and a concomitant lack of uniformity in judicial application.'
The CISG initially takes the civil law position that specific performance
of the contract may be extracted from the party in breach, regardless of
the availability of other remedies.8 2 Article 28 muddies the water, how-
ever, by providing that a court need not issue specific relief in situations
where such relief is not available under the forum's law. 3 This latter
provision was included at the insistence of the United States and the
United Kingdom, the two common law nations that do not decree spe-
cific relief without a showing that damages would not sufficiently com-
pensate the plaintiff.8 4 Article 28's effect is that an American court need
not grant specific performance unless it is available under the U.C.C.,
even where the CISG applies.
As Professor Kastely has noted, article 28 clearly hinders the goal of
interpretive uniformity sought by the CISG. 5 It also serves as concrete
evidence that, although the changes wrought by the CISG and other
treaties are revolutionary, sovereign states are not completely ready to
allow a wholesale usurpation of domestic law. Again, however, the very
balancing between municipal and international law rules represents sys-
temic change and corresponds with the world legal order's structural
changes.
4. Conclusions About the CISG
The foregoing analysis reveals that the new international sales law,
while the most important and far-reaching of the multilateral treaties en-
acted thus far, is not completely paramount even within the sphere of
international sales. Reservations allowing limitations on the treaty's
scope coupled with the treaty's opt-out feature result in a scheme far
narrower in scope than, for example, the U.C.C. And topics like prod-
ucts liability proved too sensitive for multilateral treatment.
As a nation's interest in having its own law applied within its own
borders grows stronger, its willingness to bow to international norms les-
sens. Resolving such conflicts between municipal and international law
81. See Kastely, supra note 50, at 607.
82. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 46(1) (buyer's right to specific performance) & 62 (seller's right to
specific performance).
83. CISG, supra note 3, art. 28.
84. Kastely, supra note 50, at 626.
85. Kastely, supra note 50, at 626; see CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(1) (mandating that courts
interpret the treaty with its international character in mind).
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is destined to be a key focus of subsequent international legislation. Nev-
ertheless, the CISG represents a giant step forward from the eras of con-
flicts and the law of merchants in the international unification of
commercial law.
B. Other Treaties
Although the CISG is by far the most important of the recent interna-
tional business treaties, it is by no means the only significant one. Three
other recent treaties, the United Nations Convention on International
Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes (CIBN) 6 and the
two Conventions on International Lease Financing and International
Factoring (CILF)87 are also important. If nations adopt these treaties as
widely as the CISG, the instruments will complement the CISG in form-
ing in the international arena the rough equivalent of Articles 2, 3, and 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code."8 Though sometimes also in tension
with domestic law, these additional treaties advance international busi-
ness law beyond the lex mercatoria.
1. CIBN
The CIBN's enactment is particularly noteworthy because it is another
step in the centuries-old quest to globalize the law of negotiable instru-
ments. The key characteristic of commercially useful credit instruments
is that they are negotiable, that is, able to pass freely to subsequent hold-
ers, so that such holders do not need to know the particulars of the trans-
action that originally gave rise to the instrument. Negotiability, which is
basic to all legal systems, requires that certain formal requisites are read-
ily apparent from the face of an instrument in order to cut off certain
defenses arising from the original transaction. When presented with an
instrument meeting the formal requisites of negotiability, a subsequent
holder may confidently accept the instrument without fear that the in-
strument is worthless because of fraud or other defense to payment. A
holder can sell such an instrument for a price roughly equal to its face
value.
Due to the importance of negotiability to business-people, one can
trace efforts to unify the law of negotiable instruments at least as far back
86. CIBN, supra note 47.
87. CILF, supra note 47.
88. John A. Spanogle, Introductory Note: United Nations Convention on International Bills of
Exchange and International Promissory Notes, 28 I.L.M. 170 (1989).
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as the Middle Ages, when merchants formed by uniform usage and cus-
tom a crude law of international bills of exchange. 89 This law did not
endure, however, and by the 19th century there were strong national dif-
ferences in the formal requisites for, and the consequences of, the negoti-
ability of commercial credit instruments.90 Movements on both the
regional and international fronts to "reunify" commercial instruments
law ensued, and the CIBN embodies these recent efforts.91
The CIBN's goal was not to unify the law respecting all commercial
instruments that pass in international trade. Such a task would have
never been successful because it would have overridden municipal law in
an unpredictable fashion, rather than serving the predictability and cer-
tainty goals of unification. The CIBN instead creates a new type of nego-
tiable instrument in the form of a promissory note or bill of exchange
(but not a check).92 Unlike the CISG, the CIBN has an opt-in provision,
so that it does not apply unless the parties specifically make the instru-
ment subject to the treaty.93 In addition, the CIBN will not apply unless
an instrument reveals on its face that at least two of the acts described on
the instrument (e.g., making, drawing, paying) will occur in two different
nations, at least one of which is a signatory to the treaty.
Creating a CIBN instrument gives the parties the benefit of knowing
the law under which the instrument will be paid. Moreover, this new law
has advantages and flexibility not presently found in any municipal law
of negotiable instruments. For example, the CIBN allows an instrument
89. See Jurgen Dohm, Draft Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and International
Promissory Notes, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 474 (1973); Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Theodore H. Husted, Jr., An
Approach to Drafting an International Commercial Code and a Modus Operandi Under Present
Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 1070 (1949).
90. In fact, strong differences existed even among the states of the United States. It was this
division, and its concomitant ill effect on interstate trade, that contributed to the formation of the
federal common law under the 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Swift, of course,
itself involved a bill of exchange. It is interesting to note that the abolition of the general federal
common law in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which for 96 years had served to stand-
ardize American commercial law in interstate cases, roughly coincided with the beginning of the
drafting of the U.C.C., which has since standardized virtually all American commercial law.
91. See Manley 0. Hudson & A.H. Feller, The International Unification of Laws Concerning
Bills of Exchange, 44 HARV. L. REV. 333, 334 (1931). For details concerning a regional unification
movement in Latin America, see Hugo M.B. Guerrico, Unification and Present Status of Negotiabil-
ity Legislation in America, 29 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1944).
92. CIBN, supra note 47, art. 1(3).
93. The treaty applies when the bill or note is headed with the specific words "International bill
of Exchange [or promissory note] (UNCITRAL Convention)" and when the text of the instrument
contains the same words. CIBN, supra note 47, arts. 1(1) & (2). Thus, it is impossible for parties to
create a CIBN instrument without deliberate action.
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to include interest at a variable rate.94 Few, if any, municipal laws of
commercial credit allow negotiability of an instrument with a variable
interest rate. Likewise, the CIBN allows the negotiability of an instru-
ment payable in installments,95 whereas few sovereign legal systems al-
low such a term. Installment and variable interest rate terms are,
however, important modem provisions frequently desired in interna-
tional transactions, particularly because, unlike checks, most negotiable
instruments are instruments of credit rather than merely of payment. 96
As with the CISG, however, nations' jealousy over the sanctity of their
own laws played a part in the negotiation of the CIBN. Compromises
between different legal traditions became necessary, particularly between
the civil law nations and those with a common-law tradition. One area
in which compromise was difficult was in the always-problematic area of
forged endorsements. The common-law tradition breaks the chain of ne-
gotiability if a forgery occurs, while civil law protects a bona fide taker of
a forged instrument. Thus, the common law puts the risk of a forgery
upon the taker from the forger, while the civil law puts the risk upon the
person whose signature is forged. Both positions are reasonable and both
seek to resolve tension between valid public policy concerns. In attempt-
ing to reconcile these positions, the CIBN, rather than choosing one of
the traditional positions, attempted somewhat unsuccessfully to find
compromise between them, resulting in a confusing risk-of-loss scheme.97
Despite the difficulties of harmonizing disparate municipal norms, if
the CIBN gains widespread acceptance, it is likely to have as important
an impact on the law of international negotiable instruments as the CISG
has had on sales. Parties will be strongly motivated to adopt the CIBN
as the governing law of their instruments. Increasingly, then, municipal
law and the lex mercatoria will both become irrelevant to many interna-
tional transactions involving promissory notes or bills of exchange.
2. CILF
Two other important treaties that have the potential to unify the law in
94. CIBN, supra note 47, art. 7(d). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-106 cmt. 1 (1990) (noting that an instru-
ment is not negotiable under the U.C.C. unless interest may be calculated without consulting a
source outside the instrument).
95. CIBN, supra note 47, arts. 7 (b) & (c).
96. See Dohm, supra note 89; Spanogle, supra note 88.
97. CIBN, supra note 47, arts. 25-26. See Carl Felsenfeld, Forged Endorsements Under the
United Nations Negotiable Instruments Convention: A Compromise Between Common and Civil Law,
45 Bus. LAW. 397 (1989).
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commercially important areas are the International Institute for the Uni-
fication of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Conventions on International
Lease Financing and International Factoring.9" Passed at the same con-
vention, these instruments will govern some significant financing ar-
rangements. The CILF applies to equipment financing (a tripartite
financing arrangement) and factoring (pledging of receivables) where the
lessee and lessor (or pledgee and pledgor) have their places of business in
different countries. The terminology and scope of the CILF are remarka-
bly similar to that of the CISG, and decisions interpreting one may even-
tually serve as authority for interpreting similar provisions of the other.
The CISG, CIBN, and CILF thus help to weave a new international
commercial quilt.
Moreover, the CILF treaties have the potential (again, if widely ac-
cepted) to simplify the process of reducing the risk of nonpayment in
international sales transactions. Traditionally, such risk has been spread
through cumbersome letter-of-credit transactions, which involve at least
four parties: the buyer, the seller, the buyer's bank, and the seller's bank.
Lease financing and factoring transactions, however, are tripartite in na-
ture: a third party accepts the risk of nonpayment in exchange for what
the United States would term a security interest in the goods sold.99
Such a simplification of the international financing process can only serve
to enhance the potential of international trade. Again, however, the lease
financing and factoring treaties, like the CISG and CIBN, display some
ambivalence about moving from domestic to international business
regulation.)°
C. Other Unification Efforts
In addition to the world-wide efforts to unify commercial law through
treaties, there have been several other noteworthy efforts to unify com-
mercial law. Certain initiatives even demonstrate the interface between
the three evolutionary stages in international business law. These efforts
include regional attempts to harmonize commercial law. For example,
the Latin American nations are attempting to unify the law concerning
98. CILF, supra note 47.
99. Mary Rose Alexander, Note, Towards Unification and Predictability: The International
Factoring Convention, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 353 (1989). See also Ronald Cuming, Legal
Regulation of International Financial Leasing: The 1988 Ottawa Convention, 7 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 39 (1989).
100. See id.
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the international carriage of goods by road.1° 1 This Latin American ef-
fort parallels the 1956 European Community (EC) effort in that
direction. 10 2
The EC, of course, represents a unique situation, because it is rapidly
undergoing changes that may result in its being treated, for all economic
purposes, as one nation-state. Nevertheless, there has been a prolifera-
tion of recent treaties addressing commercial issues in the EC. One of
the more interesting efforts in this direction is the Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which is an attempt to har-
monize the conflicts-of-law rules in commercial cases.103 Because this
treaty straddles the conflicts approach marking the first evolutionary pe-
riod" and the current multilateral treaty approach, 105 it is particularly
interesting given this Article's thematic context.
Finally, the current wave of international business law treaties is sup-
plemented by the older INCOTERMS (an acronym for "international
commercial terms"). Lawyers prepare these definitions of trade terms
for the Commission on International Commercial Practice of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce. The Commission first adopted a uni-
form statement of the meaning of nine such terms in 1936. The
INCOTERMS are important because parties may use them as a short-
hand way of stating their agreement, with assurance that there is an
outside, objective source for the definition of the contract terms.
Although certainly not positivistic law per se, the INCOTERMS repre-
sent a quasi-codification of the trade usages among merchants. Particu-
larly where the parties expressly refer to the INCOTERMS themselves
when incorporating those terms into a contract, much of the uncertainty
inherent in the conflicts approach, and even in the lex mercatoria ap-
proach, may be reduced. As a clarification and crystallization of trade
practices, the INCOTERMS help bridge the latter two evolutionary peri-
ods of international business.
101. Inter-American Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road,
29 ILM 81 (1990) (with commentary). For an interesting discussion of this treaty, see Paul B.
Larsan, 1989 Inter-American Convention on International Carriage of Goods by Road, 39 AM. J.
COMp. L. 121 (1991).
102. The Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Road, supra note
47.
103. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, supra note 47.
104. See supra part I.
105. See supra notes 48-100 and accompanying text.
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D. Conclusions About Multilateral Treaties
The new trend towards unification of international commercial law
through treaties is certainly growing. The CISG is already a dominant
force in the important area of international sales. The CIBN and CILF
promise similarly to prevail in international credit and financing transac-
tions. When these major multilateral efforts are considered along with
regional unification efforts, particularly in Europe, and the IN-
COTERMS' quasi-official codifications, one cannot escape the overall
conclusion that sovereign control over international business is giving
way to substantive, positivistic, truly international law. This does not
mean that all multilateral treaty efforts have been successful.106 Such
failures, however, do not undercut the importance of treaties as a positiv-
istic source of law.
IV. A NEW INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PARADIGM
This Article thus far has demonstrated the significant changes in how
the legal community regulates international business. Over the past few
centuries, that regulation has evolved from no international business law,
under the conflicts approach; to the growth of a customary law regula-
tion of international business, under the lex mercatoria approach; to fi-
nally the advent of positive public international business law, under the
multilateral treaty approach, most notably through the CISG. Of
course, in every legal discipline, domestic as well as international, the law
changes over time. However, the transformation of international busi-
ness law signifies more than just an incremental normative change: it sig-
nifies a quite radical revision in the very prism through which we view
transnational deals and disputes. Not only has the law changed, but the
legal system itself has changed. After all, the terms "private" and "pub-
lic" are polar concepts, and yet, from the first to the third evolutionary
periods, international business rules have moved from the domain of
106. One interesting example of a treaty that began with good intentions but ended in failure is
the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Inte-
grated Circuits, supra note 47. This treaty proposed to unify the law relating to patenting and
copyrighting integrated circuits, computer chips, but failed when the United States and Japan, the
leading producers of integrated circuits, refused to sign it. Predictably, the American and Japanese
objected to the treaty, claiming it provided too little protection to the producers of integrated cir-
cuits, a powerful political and economic force in both countries. The World Intellectual Property
Organization's failure is thus an unequivocal lesson to drafters of multilateral treaties: nations will
not tolerate supranational usurpation of municipal law where very important national interests are
implicated.
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"private international law" to that of "public international law." This
movement is no less than revolutionary. Recall Hannah Arendt's de-
scription of "revolutions," which do not signal "restoration" but "that an
entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to un-
fold."' °7 And revolutionaries, she wrote, "are agents in a process which
spells the definite end of an old order and brings about the birth of a new
world." 0 8
Part IV of this Article elaborates upon the thesis that a systemic
change, or revolution, is occurring in international business regulation.
It shows how that regulatory change historically relates to changes in the
world legal order itself. Moving from the medieval to the modern order,
this Part conceptualizes a "paradigmatic shift" in international business
transactions, utilizing social scientist Thomas Kuhn's influential work in
non-legal areas.t°I That the modern paradigm still contains tension be-
tween domestic and international law does not dispute the thesis, but
rather helps to prove it. Ambiguity within the law, and ambivalence
about changing it, actually demonstrates the paradigm shift: "Dual loy-
alty to the past and to that which is still to come injects an element of
incoherence in ... international law activity during any period of transi-
tion from one world order system to another."' 10 Hence, this Part seeks
theoretical coherence in explaining the interface of the three evolutionary
periods.
A. The Westphalian Order
Our history lesson moves forward from the medieval order.' 1 Under
107. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 21 (1963).
108. Id. at 35. See generally id. at ch. 1.
109. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
Analyses of Kuhn's scholarship include: BARRY BARNES, T.S. KUHN AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1982);
PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS (Gary Gutting ed., 1980); Dudley Shapere, The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions, 73 PHIL. REV. 383 (1964).
110. Richard A. Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals,
84 YALE L.J. 969 (1975). See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION, ch. 12 (1977)
(clarifying the meaning of "paradigm" and elaborating upon the transition from one paradigm to
another).
I 11. The following historical discussion of the medieval order through the seventeenth century
draws upon DAVID MALAND, EUROPE AT WAR 1600-1650 179-90 (1980); R. MOWATT, A HiS-
TORY OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 1451-1789 104-22 (1971); A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 86-125 (1947); DAVID OGG, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
118-82 (8th ed. 1961); THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (Geoffrey Parker ed., 1984); JOSEF POLISENSKY,
WAR AND SOCIETY IN EUROPE 1618-1648 17-35 (1978); THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (Theodore K.
Rabb ed., 2d ed. 1981); RANDALL, supra note 6, at 195-97; IV THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY
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the pyramidal design of a Christian commonwealth, the Pope "verti-
cally" governed Europe.' 12 The term "vertical" helps dimensionally to
describe the Pope's centralized leadership over the European hierarchy.
In other words, the medieval order was a centralized hierarchy of tribes,
farmers, church, guild, and prince, with the Pope sitting atop the pyra-
mid."' Of course, secular forces eventually opposed the Pope. When
Philip IV taxed the French clergy in the early fourteenth century, Pope
Boniface VIII issued the famous bull Unam Sanctam, defining the plenti-
tude of Papal power over all of the Christian community, including sov-
ereign France." 4 The Pope further decreed that "spiritual power
exceeds any earthly power in dignity and nobility, as spiritual things ex-
cel temporal ones."'1 In arguing against the tax, the Pope thus tried to
assert his centralized papal authority over the Holy Roman Empire.
Philip, however, defied the Pope's vertical authority, disavowing the
bull. Because he ruled over one of the first territorial units to possess the
attributes of statehood, Philip's defiance helped establish sovereignty as
the basic organizing unit of the post-Roman Empire. In 1300, it seemed
the sovereign state would become the prevailing political form in West-
ern Europe. The people's loyalty to the state was stronger than the peo-
ple's allegiance to the Pope." 6
According to most historical accounts, the Peace of Westphalia, in
1648, signifies the formal shift from the papal's vertical rule to sovereign
decentralized rule: "The sovereign state of 1300 ... was still not very
strong .... It took four to five centuries for European states to overcome
their weaknesses, . . . to bring lukewarm loyalty up to the white heat of
nationalism.""' 7 The Treaty of Westphalia formally ended the Thirty
395-433 (Adolphus W. Ward et al. eds., 1906); CICELY V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR
445-84 (1961); FALK, supra note 110, at 975-87; Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, 42
AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 24-30 (1948); Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: 4 Change in the World
Legal Order, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 269-76 (1978).
112. For other discussions of vertical (and horizontal) jurisdiction, see RICHARD A. FALK, THE
ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21-24 (1964); RANDALL,
supra note 6, at 26-29. See generally MYRES S. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1960) (analyzing institutional competencies and structuralism in the international
order).
113. Falk, supra note 110, at 980; Gross, supra note 111, at 28.
114. POPE BONIFACE VIII, BULL Unam Sanctam on the Plentitude of the Papal Power (1302),
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES, at 89 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B.
Morrall eds. & trans., 1954).
115. Id. at 91.
116. JOSEPH REESE STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 57 (1970).
117. Id.
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Years War, establishing the horizontal, non-hierarchical authority of de-
centralized nations separately over the people, resources, and activities
within the sovereign's borders. The War had its roots in 1609, when
Duke John William died without heir. That succession battle, however,
was only the match that lit an ever-lengthening and significant concep-
tual fuse. The War more fundamentally pitted the world's existing verti-
cal forces-the status quo under the pope and under the emperor's feudal
hierarchy-against the emerging horizontal forces-the growing nation-
states, emerging middle class, and the Calvinists and Lutherans. As Pro-
fessor Leo Gross puts it, prior to the Treaty of Westphalia, "powerful
intellectual, political, and social forces were at work which opposed...
the aspirations and the remaining realities of the unified control of Pope
and Emperor. In particular the Reformation and Renaissance,... each
in its own field, attacked the supreme authority claimed by the Pope and
the Emperor."11 It nevertheless took the forces for horizontal govern-
ance more than thirty full years to defeat the Hapsburg empire.
Incorporating the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, the Treaty of
Westphalia'19 lay the framework for the new sovereign-dominated world
legal order. The treaty separated church and state, but allowed each sov-
ereign to supervise religious matters within its own boundaries. This ju-
risdictional separation helped to recognize the sovereignty and
supremacy of the burgeoning nation-states. Under the Westphalian or-
der, nation-states exclusively composed the global order. Public interna-
tional law did not recognize or regulate entities other than nation-states;
such entities were objects of the law. In theory at least, each nation was
separate, equal, and free to regulate its citizens, assets, and territories.
The Westphalian arrangement thus horizontally decreed each national
government "sovereign and equal by juridical fiat, rather than by virtue
of some higher authority within the world order system."12 ° Of course,
as with all constitutive documents (such as the U.S. Constitution and
U.N. Charter), the Treaty of Westphalia contained some balancing be-
tween new and old world ideals. 2 ' A papal bull even condemned the
118. Gross, supra note 111, at 28.
119. Treaty of Westphalia (1648), in I MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 7 (Fred
L. Israel ed., 1967).
120. RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975).
121. See Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (L. Loomis trans., W.J. Black 1949) (1625);
see also Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 1946 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
1. Hugo Grotius' significant work, postulating sovereign absolutism under a natural law theory, is
said to have influenced the Westphalian document. Falk, supra note 110, at 984-85.
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Treaty,122 but to little avail. In sum, the Treaty's formation was the most
"decisive juridical event" '123 and it established the sovereign system for
the seventeenth century forward: "The Peace of Westphalia ... marks
the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majes-
tic portal which leads old into the new world."' 124
B. A Kuhnian Approach
Social scientist Thomas Kuhn's scholarship may help to illuminate the
Westphalian legal order as well as revisions of that order. In the late
1960s, Kuhn began to study the structure of revolutions in scientific dis-
ciplines. 125 His premise was that scientists in a specific area share "law,
theory, application, and instrumentation together... provid[ing] models
from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific re-
search." 126 However, Kuhn thought that historiographers were wrong
to describe those models as solely an incremental accumulation of data.
Such descriptions failed to explain scientific revolutions-"those non-cu-
mulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced
in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" 127 -- Copernican astron-
omy replacing Ptolemaic astronomy, for example.
Critical to Kuhn's approach is the concept of a "paradigm." He de-
fined that term as having two meanings. The broader usage conceptual-
izes paradigms as being "global, embracing all the shared commitments
of a scientific group." 128 A paradigm thus provides a framework for "the
entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by...
a given community." '29 The second, more dictionary-like definition con-
ceptualizes a paradigm more narrowly as "one sort of element in that
constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models
or examples can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of re-
maining puzzles of normal science."' 30 Hence, synonymous with a para-
digm's first conceptualization is the term "disciplinary matrix"-that is,
122. See BULL Zelo domus Dei condemning the Religious Clauses of the Peace of Westphalia,
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES, supra note 114, at 194.
123. Falk, supra note 110, at 982.
124. Gross, supra note 111, at 28.
125. See KUHN, supra notes 109, 110.
126. KUHN, supra note 109, at 10.
127. KUHN, supra note 109, at 92.
128. KUHN, supra note 110, at 294.
129. KUHN, supra note 109, at 175.
130. KUHN, supra note 109, at 175.
[Vol. 71:599
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/3
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
"the common possession of the practitioners of a professional discipline
• ..composed of ordered elements of various sorts."1 31 Synonymous
with the second concept is the term "exemplar"-that is, a problem-solv-
ing example that practitioners in a given community share and find use-
ful to apply in repeated circumstances.1 32
A revolution occurs when new scientific discoveries are incompatible
with the current paradigm. Although a particular paradigm can accom-
modate some incremental changes-with scientists just "mopping up" or
implementing the "normal science" of ongoing research-it cannot en-
compass new ideas that diametrically oppose the existing paradigm's
very tenets.133 After first anxiously resisting paradigmatic change, prac-
titioners may lose faith in the disciplinary matrix or exemplar to which
they were comfortably accustomed. It is quite understandable that scien-
tists would prefer working within the disciplinary framework that
formed their training and probably their life's work. People simply pre-
fer the familiar over the unfamiliar. However, individuals will revolt
against the old order when a significant amount of cognitive dissonance
occurs between new knowledge and old. Rather than representing anom-
alies in the status quo paradigm, revisionist theories incite a revolution-
ary disciplinary matrix or exemplar. Such "anomalies" are transformed
and become the new paradigm's postulates and tautologies. Kuhn's ap-
proach thus accounts for systemic revolutions, or "paradigm shifts."' 134
C. Kuhn and International Business
Although Kuhn is a social scientist, several legal commentators have
tried to apply his work to various areas of the law, including the "Erie
Doctrine,"' 135 the language and logic of individual rights;1 36 global legal
reform; 137 and, international humanitarian issues. 13  Of course, the rele-
vant task here is to analyze international business law under Kuhn's ap-
131. KUHN, supra note 110, at 297.
132. KUHN, supra note 109, at 10-11, 23-24.
133. KUHN, supra note 109, at chs. 6 & 7.
134. KUHN, supra note 109, at chs. 6 & 7.
135. William Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL.
L. REv. 907, 909-12 (1988).
136. Grardeau A. Spann, Secret Rights, 71 MINN. L. REv. 669, 701-21 (1987); See also D.H.
Kaye, The Logic and Antilogic of Secret Rights, 72 MINN. L. REv. 603, 618-19 (1988).
137. Falk, supra note 110; see also RICHARD FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 1
(1989). Professor Falk's analysis is especially valuable.
138. RANDALL, supra note 6, at cl. 9; see also Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Courts and the
Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REv. 349, 421-24 (1988).
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proach. The pressing issue is whether a paradigm shift, or revolution,
has occurred in the way that practitioners in the modem legal system
transact their international business deals.
To begin, Kuhn's historiography helps to explain the establishment of
the Westphalian legal order in the seventeenth century. The Treaty of
Westphalia represented not just incremental legal change, but established
a systemic framework for decentralized state sovereignty. The new sov-
ereign cornerstone simply could not fit within the papal-dominated pyra-
mid.13 9 Because the horizontal tenets of the Westphalian instrument
were incompatible with vertical papal authority, a new paradigm
emerged.
Philip IV's conflict with Pope Boniface VIII highlighted this paradig-
matic schism. In addition, a major confrontation, the Thirty Years War,
validated the spawning sovereign nations. 1" No less than a revolution
occurred, due to the incongruency between the horizontal forces for de-
centralization and the vertical contours of pre-Reformation Europe. The
drafters of the Treaty of Westphalia thus constituted a new disciplinary
matrix-substituting a new prism through which leaders and lawyers
saw the world.
The first evolutionary stage of international business-the conflicts pe-
riod-synchronizes with the Westphalian paradigm. Recall the absence
of any international regulation of business during that initial stage. 4'
That lacuna was due to the separatism of independent nation-states.
Without any unified international business law, separate sovereign na-
tions applied their own domestic choice-of-law rules to decide which do-
mestic substantive law to apply. This private-rather than public-
international law approach perfectly fit the decentralized Westphalian
legal order. Horizontal state sovereignty is the hallmark of the Westpha-
lian paradigm. When regulating international business, or resolving a
business dispute, each sovereign nation applied its own law (conflicts and
often substantive rules) to behavior and problems within its borders.
Under the Westphalian paradigm, no centralized mechanism existed
for harmonizing each sovereign's international business regulation. In-
stead, when there were conflicts of law, one domestic law was chosen,
superseding other municipal norms. In short, for better or worse, legal
practitioners could apply sometimes disparate conflicts theories, norms,
139. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
141. See supra part I.
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and rules during Westphalia's heyday without any cognitive dissonance
because there was neither centralized rule nor centralized rules. More-
over, classical public international law did not include private transac-
tions within its realm, leaving unregulated the activities of non-sovereign
actors.
The conflicts approach to international business, however, eventually
gave way to the lex mercatoria approach.142 This transformation was
due to changes in the world legal order following World War II. Even
though state sovereignty remained the international system's capstone,
the post-war decades gave rise to increased centralization.
Several significant trends led to such sovereign interdependence. Per-
haps most importantly, the world community established new and major
international organizations, such as the United Nations, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).143 Possessing different
but not unrelated goals, each of those institutions initiated communica-
tion, compromise, and consensus among nations. The family of nations
vertically sought cooperation and understanding, hoping never again to
engage in major armed conflict in a divided world. 1" In addition, explo-
sive advancements in telecommunications systems and international
transportation made the world somewhat smaller, causing increased cen-
tralization. Apart from such global happenings, many regions of the
world began centralization efforts following the Second World War-the
initiation of the European Community is but the most important exam-
ple of this phenomenon.145 Those regional efforts sought harmonization
on both economic and non-economic issues. Of course, all of these post-
War developments conflicted with the basic tenets of the Westphalian
142. See supra part II.
143. For background concerning such intergovernmental bodies, see FREDERIC L. KIRGIs, JR.,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING (1977).
144. For example, parties to the U.N. Charter, in the Preamble, resolve "to combine our efforts
to accomplish [the] aims" of "[saving] succeeding generations from the scourge of war," "[reaffirm-
ing] faith in fundamental human rights," and "[establishing] conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be main-
tained .... " U.N. CHARTER pmbl. Article 1 aspires that the U.N. "be a centre for harmonizing the
actions of nations in the attainment of" the U.N.'s purposes, including the achievement of "interna-
tional co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanita-
rian character .... "
145. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 25 Mar. 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
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paradigm; these developments replaced sovereign dominance and separa-
tism with global harmonization and interdependence.
The conflicts approach to international business-attributable to the
Westphalian dogma-thus contradicted the enhanced international cen-
tralization following World War II. Under private international law,
there was no attempt to reconcile or unify domestic commercial norms;
indeed, lawyers did not view international business transactions as sub-
ject to any supranational norms at all. 146 Fighting over which domestic
law to choose and racing to one's own courthouse to argue for the appli-
cation of familiar norms, however, is incompatible with a legal order at-
tempting to achieve harmony and improved foreign relations.
The conflicts approach (and the label "conflicts" means exactly what it
says-domestic law conflicts) also became less appropriate as the number
of international business transactions increased. Inconsistencies among
national commercial law became more disruptive to a stable business en-
vironment as the number and scope of deals grew. Moreover, once na-
tion-states themselves started transacting more business with private
corporate entities, the need for harmonized business norms grew. Even if
public international law traditionally was the domain of nation-states
only, 47 the line between public and private international law became
blurred once nations began engaging in international business. Nation-
states sought mutually beneficial international laws to regulate their busi-
ness conduct, just as they seek reciprocally helpful laws to regulate their
non-business conduct.
Compared with the conflicts analysis, the newer lex mercatoria ap-
proach advances international norms to foster cooperation and consensus
in business matters. In applying the emerging customary law, more neu-
tral and objective arbitral panels began replacing separate and possibly
biased domestic forums during this evolutionary stage. Seeking to re-
place domestic business rules with international rules, arbitrators tried to
divine a customary law reflecting certain business practices and usages
familiar in many parts of the world. Though some have questioned
whether the lex mercatoria really represents international law, it cer-
tainly has greater supranational qualities than the domestic law applied
during the conflicts era. The new lex mercatoria approach symbolizes
the world order's paradigmatic movement away from the rigidly central-
146. See supra part I.
147. See supra notes 5-8, 15-16 and accompanying text.
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ized tenets of Westphalia. Lawyers developed a more centralized busi-
ness law while the international paradigm itself was becoming more
centralized.
Interestingly, during the same time as the creation of the lex mer-
catoria, some regional attempts were made to create international con-
flicts-of-law treaties.' 48 These treaties, as well as the lex mercatoria,
reflect the incompatibility between private international law and the
post-World War II legal order. Bridging the first two evolutionary peri-
ods, the treaties acknowledge that more unified legal norms, arrange-
ments, and behavior must coalesce with the changing paradigm in which
legal practitioners live and work.
Hence, despite the shortcomings of the lex mercatoria, this secondary
stage helped to redefine the disciplinary matrix or exemplar of interna-
tional business. Not only the norms, but the very system of international
business changed. This second evolutionary period transitioned interna-
tional business from the decentralized conflicts paradigm to the increas-
ingly centralized multilateral treaty paradigm.
Assuming a paradigm shift opposing Westphalia, a further movement
away from the lex mercatoria and toward multilateral commercial trea-
ties is logical. Especially in the last few decades, post-war developments
have led to ever-increasing centralization and cooperation on multiple
international topics, such as human rights, terrorism, the environment,
and trade.149 Indeed, the very list of topics subject to public interna-
tional law has greatly expanded. Reached normally through global insti-
tutions, the growing international consensus concerning those subjects
demonstrates the world's centralized and harmonized treatment of major
issues. 15 0 The end of the Cold War and geopolitical polarization between
the U.S. and Soviet blocs has facilitated that normative harmonization.
Increased political agreement has led to increased normative
cooperation.
The modern global community mostly has used multilateral treaties
over the past few decades to codify its agreement on international sub-
148. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, supra note 47.
149. Indeed, as Professor Henkin argues, because nation-states create international laws they
find mutually beneficial on various subjects, "almost all nations observe almost all principles of inter-
national law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." Louis HENKIN, How NA-
TIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
150. See generally RANDALL, supra note 6, at 200-04 (discussing modern centralized institu-
tional efforts on public international law issues, particularly humanitarian concerns).
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jects. Similarly, the community has established multilateral treaties to
reach consensus and codification on international business matters.
Those treaties, most notably the CISG, CIBN, and CILF, advance be-
yond the lex mercatoria. Compared with customary international law,
written treaty law is normatively more precise, explicit, expansive, and
clear. By becoming a party to a multilateral business treaty, a nation
shows a greater commitment to the unification and harmonization of
commercial norms; it expressly commits itself to subordinate domestic
norms to international norms. By elevating interdependence over sover-
eignty, nations help to establish a new, centralized paradigm for interna-
tional business transactions.
The prominent CISG replaces horizontally oriented norms with verti-
cally oriented norms, unless the business partners expressly opt-out of
the treaty's application. In short, the treaties' centralized treatment of
international business perfectly matches the international paradigm's
centralized treatment of other significant non-business issues. As with
the horse and the cart, the new world order's structural trends have given
rise to multilateral treaties, and those centralized norms, in turn, have
precipitated more structural interdependence among nations. The new
paradigm will continue to crystallize as international business grows, as
sovereigns transact more international business, and as more comprehen-
sive commercial and business treaties are created.
The CISG and other treaties do have limitations. They have a re-
stricted scope; they contain mechanisms that occasionally preempt treaty
law with municipal law; and they sometimes strike a contradictory bal-
ance between domestic and international law. This tension, however,
does not foreclose the possibility of a paradigm shift. It actually is logical
that practitioners in any subject area (scientific or legal) would display
ambivalence about a radical change in their discipline. As Kuhn and
others argue, such tension really demonstrates that a paradigmatic shift
is occurring.151 Any significant systemic change naturally causes tension
and even disarray. The Thirty Years War led to the Westphalian para-
digm. Another major armed confrontation, the Second World War, gave
rise to increased centralization, moving the world order away from the
Westphalian paradigm. Those who constituted the Treaty of Westphalia
commingled old and new world ideas and values in that instrument, 15 2
151. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 133-34 and accompanying
text.
152. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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just as did those who constituted the United Nations Charter (and even
the United States Constitution).
The modem multilateral business treaties similarly contain systemic
ambiguities. These treaties commit lawyers to supranational commercial
law, but also show some reluctance to give up sovereignty on certain
legal issues. The creation of these documents has not been without disa-
greement. This disagreement is quite understandable considering the sig-
nificant revision in the way the instruments regulate international
business. The CISG, CIBN, and CILF do not yet represent an entire
international commercial code; and other treaty efforts admittedly have
been less successful.' 53
During even the early years of the modem evolutionary era, however,
it is possible to view the treaties at least as an exemplar, rather than as a
disciplinary matrix.' 54 The modem treaties may befit Kuhn's use of
"paradigm" in its narrower, less universal sense-providing a sufficient
"puzzle solution" for only a few particular types of sales and other leas-
ing and factoring deals subject to the treaties described above. It is possi-
ble, of course, that such exemplars will develop soon into an entire
disciplinary matrix, particularly as lawyers continue to create additional
multilateral business treaties. However, one cannot deny the radical
change in the way lawyers transact international business. The legal
community has completely reconceptualized international business from
being subject to private international law-which meant no substantive
regulation under the conflicts approach-to being subject to the signifi-
cant public international law of the modem era of multilateral treaties.
This normative reconceptualization is emblematic of a paradigm shift,
because the centralized multilateral treaty approach to international
business simply does not square with the decentralized tenets of West-
phalia. In international business transactions, the world community is
ringing out and replacing the old paradigm with the new. Even if the
new international business tale has not yet been entirely written or told,
it is in more than its first draft.
CONCLUSION
The world has become more interdependent and cooperative. En-
hanced economic and political harmony have led to increased interna-
153. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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tional trade. Following the Second World War, however, international
lawyers and business-people suffered from a lack of any real substantive
international law to shape and govern their expanding transnational
deals. Linked with an era of national separatism and heightened state
sovereignty, the conflicts-of-law approach chose one domestic commer-
cial law to control a business deal, often contradicting the domestic
norms of one of the other dealmaker's countries. Seeking predictability
and stability, international actors started to replace the conflicts ap-
proach with the new lex mercatoria approach, relying upon certain ac-
cepted business practices to formulate their transactions. Increased
centralization in today's world community has precipitated the modem
approach to international business, with multilateral commercial treaties
supplanting the less-positivistic lex mercatoria. In sum, international
partners have radically reformed the way they transact business, moving
from no international commercial law to today's significant commercial
treaty law.
This normative shift is quite logical; it corresponds to changes in the
world legal order itself. Furthermore, it is sensible that the legal commu-
nity would create and shape norms, during any era, in a way befitting the
contours of that community. Accordingly, now that the world legal or-
der is increasingly centralized and interdependent, one would expect the
legal community to generate more supranational norms to govern the
greatly expanding international trade.
The changes in international business today suggest more than an in-
cremental revision of the law-they symbolize a paradigmatic shift in the
international business system itself, a shift in the structural underpin-
nings of the legal order. Drawing upon social science learning, the Au-
thors hope this Article offers theoretical coherence to the new
international business landscape and demonstrates the emergence of a
new paradigm of international business transactions.
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